Rethinking Democratization: Authoritarian Reformism in Post-Revolutionary Egypt

On February 11, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt resigned after almost thirty years in office. The culmination of eighteen days of protest and demonstration across Egypt, this resignation brought an end to an age of authoritarianism and inspired hope for a new era of democracy, egalitarianism, and economic prosperity. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for September 2011 and a presidential election was promised before the end of the year – all indicators of a smooth transition toward democracy. But as the year drew to a close and the transition period was officially extended from six months to fifteen, observers of the post-revolutionary period became skeptical of a truly democratic Egypt.

Now, two years since the Arab Spring protests of January 2011, Egypt does not seem any closer to achieving the goals of the revolution. Ideological disagreements and economic instability plague the country, and President Mohamed Morsi, elected in June 2012 on a slim majority, is criticized for leading the nation backwards to authoritarianism. This unpromising state of democratic development begs the question: what happened in Egypt? Why is this country, one that showed so much potential, struggling to transition to a solvent democracy?

Political scientists have analyzed the nature of democracy for centuries, with the so-called Third Wave of Democratization from 1974 through the early 21st century presenting new case studies of state-building.[1] Most agree that states must possess certain pre-conditions before investing in democracy building, and that societies have varying capacities for governance. Post-revolutionary states like Egypt are particularly susceptible to being carried away by a zealous desire for immediate change, but too rapid a transition to democracy often condemns the state, risking both a reversion to authoritarianism and counter-revolution.

The majority of academic literature on democratization is reactionary, describing the ways in which certain societies, such as the post-Soviet bloc states of Eastern Europe, have transitioned from authoritarianism. While these historical analyses are helpful, international affairs literature is lacking in canon that prescribes methods for democratization. As the international community faces a future of governmental transition, especially in the Middle East, it is important for states to understand what steps can be taken to prepare for democracy. Defining a period of post-revolutionary transition between the authoritarian government and democracy is essential for growth. Best described as a period of authoritarian reform, this stage would encompass a suspension of the government to allow for unhindered, non-partisan construction of the necessary infrastructure that would later make democracy successful.

By contextualizing authoritarian reformism in post-revolutionary Egypt, it is clear that Egypt could have avoided its current tensions and state of counter-revolution if it had undergone authoritarian reformism before establishing full democracy.

The concept that pre-conditions are necessary for successful democracy is intuitive in that democracy requires certain infrastructures to operate. A focus on infrastructure is especially important in post-revolutionary states, considering the bureaucratic and institutional requirements of an authoritarian regime are drastically different from those of a democracy. Beyond physical institutions, governments need to be trained to support democracy. This is described as ‘democratic consolidation’, or the entrenchment of democracy in a society.[2] The individual areas of this consolidation are usually categorized as the civil, political, economic and security elements of the state; essentially, in order for a post-revolutionary state to have the capacity for democracy, it must “possess the means necessary to maintain the rule of law, to protect the rights of citizens, and to regulate economic transactions.”[3]

Arguably, the political preconditions for democracy are the most crucial to establish before attempting a complete transition. Before any society can hope to legitimately practice democracy, it must first possess the infrastructure necessary to carry out democratic processes. It is important to make a distinction between political infrastructure and political institutions, with the former being the structural mechanisms that facilitate referenda, voter registration and local representation, and the latter meaning the organization of the branches of government and the content of the constitution. Many examples of failed democratization emerged from states trying to immediately redefine and democratize the state institutions without first even having the structure to facilitate democracy. Constitutional referenda and parliamentary elections become meaningless if only a portion of the population has access to voting and representation.

The establishment of political preconditions is especially important in post-authoritarian states, as the infrastructure available after the revolution would still be designed for a centralization of authority, rather than a dispersal of power to the local level. The establishment of local government headquarters not only improves faith in the transitional government, but these bureaucracies also later allow for an even implementation of policy across society.

Economic infrastructure is also crucial for a transitioning state. Legitimate democracy demands citizen participation, so it is important that individuals are given the opportunity to do so. This opportunity stems from more than just physical access to voter registration, but is also linked to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: without access to basic physiological needs and economic security, individual citizens have no motivation toward political participation. This is especially important in post-revolutionary societies, as revolutions are often motivated by both political and economic factors.

In Egypt, the Arab Spring revolution was not only a rebellion against the authoritarian government of President Mubarak, but was also a reaction to poor economic conditions and a severe wealth disparity, with one of the most popular slogans of the masses being “bread, freedom, social justice” and 65 percent of polled revolutionaries naming the state of the economy as the primary reason behind ousting Mubarak.[4] [5] Even with economic motivations being so integral to revolutionary demands, Egyptian economic development post-revolution was put second to the immediate establishment of democracy, a contributing factor to the current instability.

Finally, states require a capacity for security in order to undergo governmental transition. This precondition is necessitated in two ways: first, a society must overhaul its security infrastructure in order to re-inspire public faith in the state, and second, so that the government possesses a legitimate mechanism for maintaining public safety and implementing the newly established democratic norms. If a post-revolutionary state attempts to construct democracy before guaranteeing the precondition of security, it will be plagued by the legacy of corruption and manipulation of the former authoritarian regime. Examples of this form of mistrust are also evident in Egypt, with the revolutionary public remaining suspicious of the military and governmental officials who maintained their posts throughout the revolution.

Given that academics agree on the importance of capacity in state building, and especially in the case of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, it is interesting that no coherent recommendation for building these preconditions exists. It is difficult to apply a singular method to all democratic transitions, considering the importance of individual aspects of each revolution and revolutionary state, but it is still possible to develop theoretical approaches to these situations; hence, the necessity for authoritarian reformism. Essentially, a period of authoritarian reform would follow a successful revolution while preceding the declaration of democracy by the interim or transitional government.

While the interim government would still respect the long-term democratic aspirations of the revolutionary populace, it would postpone democratic practices such as elections and constitutional referendum until the preconditions for democracy were established. Considering the nonpartisan nature of the preconditions, in that the sustainability of political infrastructure, economic stability and state security efficiency can be gaged objectively, these elements can be more effectively established by an administration whose sole purpose is creating such capacity. Such an interim government would make no claims to restructuring the system in any ideological way, but would act as the construction team that rebuilds the post-revolutionary society toward democracy.

This theoretical stage of democratization can be better understood by applying it to Egypt, and by engaging in a hypothetical look at how the post-revolutionary period would have unfolded if Egypt had gone through a period of authoritarian reform before opening democracy. On February 11, 2011, Mubarak delivered his resignation, and his vice president Omar Suleiman announced that the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) would assume power as the interim government.[6] SCAF, in turn, quickly promised a handover of power to an elected civilian government, outlining the transition timeline discussed earlier, with both parliamentary and presidential elections assured by the end of the year.

The decision to make such a guarantee was a mistake, in that any delay, a perfectly natural expectation from a transitioning society, would be perceived as an intentional stalling by SCAF and proof of their illegitimacy. Instead, SCAF should have focused on establishing infrastructure. Comprised of military officials who had largely supported the revolutionaries against Mubarak, this group has both the relationship with the revolutionary cause and the intimate knowledge of state infrastructure to effectively spearhead such an overhaul.

The importance of establishing preconditions in Egypt is highlighted further in evaluating the criticisms levied against the government in the two years since the resignation of Mubarak and the difficulties experienced while trying to establish a democracy. On March 19, 2011, a referendum was held regarding constitutional amendments and governmental structure. While 77 percent of the voters supported the changes to the constitution, which included a reduction of the presidential term from six to four years and a two-term limit, only 41.2 percent of the population voted.[7] While this voter turnout is not necessarily egregious, it indicates that the referendum was conducted in a way that was not conducive to majority participation. In the time since the referendum, the Egyptian political system has been plagued by intense ideological debate between political parties and religious groups during subsequent constitutional referenda. This division may have been mitigated if the referendum had been postponed until later.

As mentioned, a large motivator of the original Egyptian revolution was economic instability and income disparity, a factor that especially inspired the younger generation of Egyptians who faced a dismal future under the Mubarak regime. It is then curious that more attention was not given to immediately solving this economic instability; rather, when looking to the evolution of the post-revolutionary period, economic issues were demoted in deference to constitutional challenges. While a loan to Egypt of $4.3 billion was approved from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in November 2012, completion of this deal was continuously delayed as the Egyptian judiciary voted on a new constitution.[8]

In the midst of this, newly elected President Morsi faced increased criticism, not only for failing to facilitate the loan, but also for stalling other reforms, such as new taxation policies. Prolonging the economic instability in Egypt by not reforming financial institutions has acted to undermined both the legitimacy of and faith in the government, fostering a distrust that has permeated the government’s ability to enact reform in other areas as well.

This type of public distrust would cripple any government, but especially undermines the efficacy of a transitioning state. One of the most important stages of reform is that of the state security mechanism. Egypt, with its long history of authoritarianism and entrenched military leadership, should have immediately reformed the security structure in order to gain the public’s trust. On March 5, 2011, revolutionary crowds raided numerous offices of the State Security Investigations Service, looking for evidence of abuse during the Mubarak regime.[9] A month later, protesters gathered for a ‘Friday of Cleansing’ during which they criticized SCAF for not purging former corrupt regime figures.[10]

If the interim government had engaged in a period of authoritarian reform, during which they had systematically assessed the credibility of past regime figures and brought them to public trial, they would have avoided these periods of continued revolution while also gaining the trust of the masses. By not focusing on establishing the capacity for state security, SCAF and the transitional regime undermined their own legitimacy and brought into question their commitment to the revolutionary goals.

There seems to be an assumption that in order for a democratic revolution to be deemed “successful” there must be an immediate transfer of power to the people. Failure to do so in an “appropriate” time frame has often led to counter-revolution or international criticism. But given that democracy can only flourish given certain preconditions, it is important to have realistic expectations of state capacity, especially when examining systems that are making the dramatic change from authoritarianism to democracy. Although it is impossible to create a how-to guide for post-revolutionary state-building, theoretical recommendations for democratization can help both academics and state officials alike, by elaborating the ways in which states can improve their capacity for governance.

Authoritarian reformism, on face, may appear to prolong authoritarianism and ignore revolutionary desires, but considering that democracy’s chance of long-term success is reliant upon the establishment of preconditions, it is a valuable step in the overall process of democratization. As illustrated through a cursory application of this approach to post-revolutionary Egypt, authoritarian reformism could eliminate the opportunity for criticism by strengthening infrastructure and improving government legitimacy, all while respecting revolutionary aims. While democratization will never be a perfect transition, states should at least try to construct an atmosphere in which democracy has the best hope for survival.

Grace Rosinski
International Affairs & History ’13

 

[1] Laurel E. Miller et al., Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons From Around the Globe (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2012), 9-10.
[2]   Ibid., 16.
[3]  Jessica Fortin, “Is There a Necessary Condition for Democracy? The Role of State Capacity in Postcommunist Countries,” Comparative Political Studies 45 (2012): 904.
[4]  Miller et al., Democratization in the Arab World, 85.
[5]   John R. Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts. (NYC: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 10.
[6]  “Hosni Mubarak resigns as president,” Al Jazeera, 11 February 2011, accessed February 20, 2013,http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121125158705862.html.
[7] “Egypt referendum strongly backs constitution changes,” BBC News, 20 March 2011, accessed February 20, 2013,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12801125.
[8]   Abdel-Rahman Hussein, “Egypt’s IMF loan deal postponed after Mohamed Morsi scraps tax increases,” The Guardian, 11 December 2012, accessed February 20, 2013,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/11/egypt-imf-loan-delay-morsi.
[9]  Ursula Lindsey, “Secret Egyptian Security Service Files Exposed,” The Daily Beast, 7 March 2011, accessed February 20, 2013,http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/07/egyptians-expose-secret-files-of-state-security-service.html.
[10]   Kristen Chick, “Egypt’s Army, once the darling of protesters, is now the subject of criticism,” Christian Science Monitor, 8 April 2011, accessed February 20, 2013,http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0408/Egypt-s-Army-once-the-darling-of-protesters-is-now-the-subject-of-criticism.

 

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