A Path to a Unified Korea: Redefining the Korean Reunification in the 21st Century

 The Present and Prospective East Asian Geopolitical Structure

Korean economists often say “every time China or the US sneezes, it’s Korea that catches the cold.” This saying applies to both political and economic realities facing South Korea. Caught between the two superpowers, South Korea’s political and economic decisions are inevitably dependent on the policies of Beijing and Washington. In fact, the economic profit that South Korea gains from its trade relations with China surpasses the profit that South Korea gains from trade with the United States (US) and Japan combined.[i] Still, the US maintains a crucial military alliance with South Korea, with more than 28,000 US soldiers stationed on the peninsula.[ii] However, one policy decision making area of which South Korea should be more independent and active, despite its relationship with the Washington and Beijing, is its foreign policy on the Democratic People’s Republic of [North] Korea (DPRK) and the possible reunification of the Korean peninsula.

If South Korea does not take a more active posture on the North and the subject of reunification, the fate of the Korean peninsula might end up in the hands of a third party – China. It is no secret that China, utilizing its rising economic and military power, has been slowly but firmly expanding its sphere of influence not only into neighboring regions, but also into South and Central Asia.[iii] This is evident from Beijing’s recent foreign policy decisions that present some surprisingly aggressive expansionist features. Regarding the South China Sea, the Chinese government declared that it “has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and adjacent waters,” and even commenced small scale naval exercises in the sea and surrounding waters, causing a rift in its relations with Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan.[iv] Recent developments in China, including the development of its first aircraft carrier,[v] are other tangible representations of Beijing’s expansionist policies.

East Asia, especially North Korea, is not excluded from China’s growing influence. While China experienced vast economic and military growth, North Korea’s economy and internal political stability deteriorated, ultimately forcing the country to rely even more heavily on China than it had over the preceding decades. To cite a few exemplary cases of expanding Chinese influence in North Korea, China has been granted exclusive mining rights to the North Korean gold reserves, consisting of an estimated 2,000 tons of gold deposits. By comparison, the US has an estimated 2,700 tons of gold deposits, while South Korea has about 43 tons.[vi][vii] Not only has China shown off its friendly relationship with the North by stating that the Chinese-North Korean relationship is as strong as blood ties,[viii] but during this year’s 50^th anniversary celebration of the Sino-North Korean relationship, China went on to state that it will always be committed to its mutual aid treaty with the North[ix]. This treaty commits Beijing to render military and other assistance to Pyongyang against any outside attack[x]. China’s pledge was tested intermittently between 2009 and 2011 when North Korea, under the direction of its eccentric leader Kim Jong-Il, committed extremely hostile acts of aggression against South Korea, including the shelling of the South Koran Island Yeonpyong,[xi] and the sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan.[xii] Both acts were met with harsh criticism from the international community. The fact that China re-instated its mutual aid treaty with the North even after these events proves that China’s supportive position on North Korea will most likely remain the same in future. Furthermore, starting in January of this year, China has started stationing troops in the Rajin-Sonbong region of North Korea. Official statements by Chinese and North Korean authorities affirm that the troops are stationed to protect port facilities in which China has invested. However, with a military presence in the region, there is the very real possibility that Beijing could intervene in Korean affairs by sending a large number of troops into the North under the pretext of protecting its residents there in case of an emergency.[xiii]

If Chinese expansionist trends in North Korea continue, the future of the Korean peninsula, as well as the geopolitical nature of East Asia, could become dangerously precarious. If the current pace of China’s rise and the North Korean dependency on China continues, eventually, China’s ‘absorption’ of North Korea could be quite possible. To clarify, the term ‘absorption’ in this context does not mean military or political annexation of the North by China, but more of a ‘Chinasation’ of DPRK. This ‘Chinasation’ would include North Korea’s complete economic reliance on China and the integration of North Korea’s territorial sovereignty and military powers with that of China. To make this concept more easily understandable, think of North Korea becoming China’s second Tibet, wherein China yields a significant amount of political and economic control over North Korea. If these developments were to occur, the likelihood of Korean reunification would become almost non-existent due to Beijing’s control over DPRK. Moreover, China’s already threatening naval expansion in the South China Sea could also spill over to the East Sea, causing a buildup of military tension between China, South Korea, and Japan, which in turn could cause a Cold-War like arms race in the region.

 South Korea’s Contemporary Foreign Policy on North Korea

In order to avoid the aforementioned scenario, South Korea must pursue an active foreign policy regarding North Korea. Generally speaking, Seoul’s foreign policy debate on North Korea has been dominated by two major reunification approaches. One approach, favored by more liberal political parties such as the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) defines the reunification of the Korean peninsula as a gradual and procedural process to improve inter-Korean relationships. This policy stance emphasizes the need for an increase in bilateral trade relations and friendly diplomatic relations between the two Koreas, gradually narrowing the political differences, and reducing the hostilities between the two countries. The other reunification policy, advocated by more conservative political parties like the current ruling Grand National Party (GNP), employ more of a ‘wait and see’ approach. This policy presumes that although increases in inter-Korean relations are important, unfortunately, North Korea’s hard-line diplomacy will not fundamentally change, nor will it be affected by the South’s friendly gestures. Instead of actively pursuing increases in inter-Korean relations, this policy favors firm stances on North Korea, and emphasizes the idea that South Korea should prepare for the post-reunification era that would arrive with the collapse and deterioration of the North Korean regime. An example of this policy can be found in current President Lee Muyng-bak’s proposal for additional tax increases in 2010 to create a separate budget to rebuild the deteriorated North Korean economy and infrastructure in anticipation of future Korean reunification. A prominent example of the policy pursued by the DPK is the Sunshine Policy. Initiated during former President Kim Dae-Jung’s administration (1998-2003) this policy was famous for the tremendous amount of economic aid it allocated to North Korea. It did so in an attempt to lure the North into international dialogues and persuade the state to abandon its nuclear program. There were some successes to the Sunshine Policy. For example, inter-Korean relationships were soothed, North Korea decreased its harsh and hostile rhetoric against South Korea and in 2000 President Kim Dae-Jung was invited to a series of face-to-face talks with Kim Jong-Il and was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

Ultimately, however, the project failed; Kim Jong Il’s regime continued to develop its nuclear program, thereby threatening the peace and the stability of the Korean peninsula, and failed to increase its participation in international dialogue. What current and future South Korean policy makers need to remember is that neither the current strategy of the GNP nor the past strategy of the DPK have succeeded in successfully engaging Pyongyang. Despite both parties differing efforts, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear program, commit acts of aggression and violence against South Korea, and use its brutal method of oppression to suppress any political freedom while its citizens are dying from hunger and economic stagnation.

 Active Diplomatic Foreign Policy as a Solution

With China being the primary source of support for North Korea, it is crucial for South Korea to persuade Beijing to end its unilateral support of the North and reign in its hostile behaviors. First and foremost, South Korean policy makers must attempt to understand the reasons behind increasing Chinese support and influence in North Korea. One need not look farther than the current condition of diplomatic relations amongst East Asian countries with the so-called superpowers to understand why. For example, Japan has always been a trustworthy and dependant ally of the US since the end of the World War II. Japan hosts more than 35,600 US military personnel, and 5,500 Department of Defense civilian employees. The 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force is based in Okinawa, and 130 United States Air Force fighters are stationed in the Misawa Air and Kadena air bases. Japan is also protected under the US nuclear umbrella. Concurrently, South Korea’s has retained a historic and military alliance with the US, and has not given a clear indication of the end-goal of this relationship. As such, Beijing has enlisted the North to offset this strategic alliance. To China, the military relationships amongst Japan, South Korea and the US will surely cause Beijing to perceive that Washington is surrounding and pressuring it through its relationships with Seoul and Tokyo. Naturally, as a responsive measure to the increased American presence in East Asia, Beijing will seek to rely on DRPK as its sole ally in the region, supporting the DPRK even in its pursuit of nuclear development and increased military proliferation. South Korea must emphasize that its military ties with the US are a deterrence measure against North Korea, not China. This is a classic example of Kenneth Waltz’ ‘security dilemma’ which states that even if one nation was to increase its military capabilities for purely defensive purposes without clarification of its intentions, such military build-up may threaten its surrounding nations, forcing them to increase their military capabilities as well, escalating overall regional tension. Even the South China Sea, where tensions run high between China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan, is known for the lurking US nuclear submarine, the USS George Washington.[xiv][xv]Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in his recent book, On China, highlights that historically China has always feared the prospect of being surrounded by foreign forces and influences.[xvi] Thus, South Korea must increase its diplomatic relationships and communications with China, in the process focusing on each country’s respective military build-ups while attempting to sooth China’s growing concerns over US military presence in East Asia.

South Korea is in a very unique position. While many countries in South East Asia have strong military ties with the US and hold anti-Chinese sentiments, South Korea has strong ties with the US and shares in economic and cultural prosperity with China. Such a unique relationship gives South Korea the opportunity to act as a mediator between the US and China, becoming a center of US-Sino communications on South East Asian affairs. South Korea must utilize its unique position to pacify growing US-Chinese tension on the East Asian front, to ease China’s concern about the US military’s presence in the region, and to assure China that it will not be surrounded by foreign force and influences. The South must convince China that there is no legitimate reason for it to support North Korea who, through its belligerent behavior, gives China a bad reputation in the international community. With North Korea no longer burdening China with repeated missile tests and inflammatory rhetoric, Beijing can have a more prominent role in the international community.

South Korea must also ensure and stress that a unified Korea would be friendly to its regional neighbors, mainly China, and diplomatic partners, chiefly the US. South Korea should highlight the economic profits that Korean reunification could bring to all parties with a vested interest in the Korean peninsula. For example, with both Koreas unified, an underwater railway connecting Europe, Russia, and China via Korea and Japan could be built, making trade within the Eurasian region much more efficient. As evidenced by Russia’s recent suggestion of building an oil pipeline through North Korea to South Korea and Japan,[xvii] involved parties would see tangible economic benefits from Korean reunification.

If it is Not Time for Diplomacy, Then it is Time for Action

If the aforementioned diplomatic efforts fail, and if North Korea’s threats and China’s unilateral support of it continues, South Korea, instead of simply taking passive and responsive measures to North Korean provocation, could instead pursue its own version of hard-line diplomacy. Such a position would act as a counter-weight to North Korean provocation and concurrently send a strong message to China. Although a long shot, South Korea could consider requesting the US deploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. This idea has been floating about in the minds of South Korean policy makers for some time. In November of 2010, South Korea’s then Defense Minister Kim Kwan-Jin stated that Seoul and Washington were set to review the possibility of deploying US tactical nuclear weapons at the next meeting of the US-South Korean defense ministers.[xviii] In March of this year, Chung Mong-Joon, one of South Korea’s richest individuals, CEO of Hyundai Heavy Industries, a Grand National Party politician and candidate for in next year’s presidential election, also addressed the issue of deploying tactical nuclear warheads in South Korea[xix]. Responding to these calls, Gary Samore, the White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, simply stated that, “All South Korea had to do was ask.”[xx]The idea of deploying US Tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea is not new. Over the course of 33 years, from 1958 to 1991, the United States dispatched hundreds of nuclear weapons in the South. Although over the years the quantity and the types of nuclear weapons changed, by 1967 as many as 950 tactical nuclear warheads were deployed in South Korea.[xxi] Eventually, with the Presidential Nuclear Initiative by George H.W. Bush in 1991, all of the U.S tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from South Korea.

That being said, South Korea’s development of its own nuclear program is something that even the United States is opposed to. Though the South began a nuclear weapons program in 1970, by 1975 the US had pressured France, the South’s main supplier, into not delivering a reprocessing facility, effectively ending the countries bid to develop nuclear weapons. Finally, under the pressure from the United States, Korea ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 23^rd, 1975. Although President Park Chung-Hee said in 1977 that South Korea would not develop or try to develop any nuclear weapons, he continued a clandestine program to do so which only ended following his assassination in October 1979.[xxii]However, since the end of the Korean War, South Korea has been protected by the US nuclear umbrella. This nuclear umbrella commits the US to engaging in nuclear retaliations against North Korea if the North attempts to invade South Korea or initiates any type of significant nuclear threats. In this sense, even if South Korea currently does not possess any US tactical nuclear weapons, through the US nuclear umbrella, South Korea has nuclear capabilities.

Those who fear that South Korean’s possession of US tactical nuclear weapons would cause precarious military tension in the region must understand that were to be deployed, these tactical weapons would still be under the control of the US government. As mentioned earlier, the US already has a long history in the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, and the redeployment of such weapons should be considered as an extension of the current US nuclear umbrella over South Korea as opposed U.S nuclear armament of South Korea.

Finally, nuclear weapons, once deployed in South Korea, could become an integral and valuable bargaining chip for the South. Tactical nuclear weapons would serve neither an offensive nor defensive military purpose. To illustrate, consider the central purpose behind North Korea’s nuclear development. Hidden behind the ideology of Juche, or self-sufficiency, North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons primarily as a negotiation tool. Demonstratively, over the past 20 years, North Korea has repeated the same general pattern in the conduct of its foreign policy. Starting out by pretending to be interested in talks, North Korea suddenly changes its attitude using nuclear threats to escalate tension and anxiety, all the while concurrently manipulating this anxiety to acquire economic and/or energy aid by promising to halt its nuclear program. Nor does North Korea have any intention of actually using its nuclear weapons against South Korea, Japan, or the United States because North Korea is aware of the consequences. It is against Pyongyang’s interests to use these weapons as they would be decimated in any eventual war with its regional neighbors. The same policy approach should be utilized by South Korea. Using US tactical weapons as a bargaining chip, South Korea should demand that the North completely abandon its nuclear weapons program and comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency regulations in exchange for the withdrawal of US weapons in South Korea.

What will truly escalate military tension in East Asia is not the mere presence of nuclear weapons in the South, but rather the perceptions and reactions of its neighbors to their deployment. If Seoul initiates its own nuclear development, either through its own nuclear program or vis-à-vis US warheads, Japan and Taiwan would most likely follow suit and develop their own nuclear weapons, and China and North Korea would surely respond in kind.

Conclusion

Current and future South Korean policy makers must keep in mind that in order to effectively address the challenges posed by North Korea, an active foreign policy regarding North Korea and China must be undertaken. For too many years, South Korea has pursued a passive diplomatic path, always being lead on and dragged on by North Korea, to no avail. Whether it is the pursuit of diplomatic foreign policy that wins over the minds of the surrounding nations, or the hard-line stance that involves deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, South Korea must make tangible decisions that can bring real changes to the Korean peninsula.