In the coming decades, there are a handful of states that could realistically align themselves with either the liberal-democratic international order—a system of international relations defined by adherence to international law, open and liberal free trade, and belief in the natural rights of human beings—or today’s autocracies. Such geopolitically fickle states hesitate to commit themselves to any one ideological bloc, allyship, or military alliance; they ebb and flow their support between democracies and autocracies with what their national interests need at the time. Many states comply with this definition, but the most notable are developing states with primacy in their region, such as Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa, all of which aspire to a higher standing in international affairs. The question for the United States is: what to do with them?
It would be in the interest of the United States to ally with fickle states so long as they prove firm and tangible steps to liberalization and democratization, as ignoring them means handing a possible ally to an autocratic regime. The difficulty arises from the fact that fickle states are usually illiberal democracies, and as such, are tolerant of undemocratic ideas and authoritarian countries. Fickle states usually have important hallmarks of democracies, such as regular elections or constitutions, but their institutions are flawed and internal social problems threaten the legitimacy of the government. For example, in India, violence against women and girls is condemned but given negligible attention by the government; in Turkey, journalists can write until their work distresses the state; in South Africa, internal corruption in the government and income inequality run rampant.
Fickle states are tolerant of undemocratic ideas. This poses an issue for the liberal-democratic international order, as fickle states are willing to support the United States and its allies, but also autocracies like China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea.
It would be advantageous for the United States to give a hand to fickle states, but it is important to not compromise principle before allying with whoever is prudent to our interests. The proven and dependable allies of the United States are other democratic law-abiding nations who accept the rules-based international order. The United States has enough soft power to realistically influence other illiberal states to liberalism before allyship. The United States has already done this with states like Ukraine—which had NATO aspirations before Russia’s invasion—and post-war West Germany and Japan.
Allyship with fickle states is possible. Doing so is possible through many means, such as by negotiating favorable trade deals and increasing foreign aid and disaster relief to fickle countries (analogous to Harry Truman’s Marshall Plan, which ensured post-war Europe would re-industrialize and, as an added perk, remain preferential to the United States). This has already proven to work, for example, when the United States contributed $20 million dollars to the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan. The United States can also incentivize fickle states by shielding them with the nuclear umbrella, which would appeal to democratizing ex-Soviet states such as Kazakhstan or Georgia (the latter of which is currently negotiating with violent protests due to the governing pro-Kremlin party suspending Georgia’s bid to join the European Union).
When promoting military aid or guaranteeing security, the United States can also tie reforms to such agreements, such as ensuring greater steps towards transparency in the host government. This can be done through stricter enforcement of the Leahy Laws of 2008, which prohibits the Pentagon from providing military aid to countries that have violated human rights laws. The United States has already exercised the Leahy Laws by withholding aid to Pakistan after reports of extrajudicial killings during skirmishes with the Taliban in 2010. It has also been applied to Indonesia and Columbia. Such laws would also prevent American support for dictatorships as it has in the past, such as through clandestine US intervention in Latin America to prevent left-wing leaders from assuming power.
It is important to follow these measures sooner rather than later. Autocratic states have already warmed relations with fickle ones. In October 2024, Russia brokered a deal with Pakistan to export Russian chickpeas for Pakistani-grown rice due to Western sanctions that upset the Russian economy. Despite his liberal views and partnership with the United States, Brazilian president Lula da Silva has courted Russian president Vladimir Putin and called for Ukraine to cede occupied Crimea. Turkey has expressed interest in joining BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa): an intergovernmental organization and de facto political bloc spearheaded by Russia and China. Recent history—from World War Two, to the Korean War, to the Cold War—has demonstrated the importance of allyships, and the world’s autocracies know so.
Thankfully, the United States has, to an extent, allied with fickle countries. Despite its BRICS ambitions, Turkey is a NATO member; similarly, the United States considers Argentina to be a “major non-NATO ally of the United States,” despite president Javier Milei backsliding the country’s democracy. The Biden administration has kept Indian membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: an alliance between the United States, Australia, Japan, and India designed to combat Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. On November 17, 2024, Joe Biden became the first sitting president to visit the Amazon, pledging to warm Brazilian-American ties to combat climate change.
However, what has been done is not enough. The true allies of the United States have always been countries that have shared democratic values that abide by the liberal international order, and an end to it would mean an international system led by autocrats like Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, or Ali Khamenei. History demonstrates the United States has the soft power to liberalize fickle countries; the liberal-democratic order hinges on whether the United States chooses to lend a hand to them.
