Military Politicization in the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring in Northern Africa and the Middle East is arguably the first widespread  liberal democratic uprising in the history of the region.  While nearly every country in this area  of the world experienced backlash against the government in one form or another, the North African Arabian belt, specifically Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria, ought to be viewed as the focal point of these widespread uprisings due to their pioneering of these movements and subsequent exportation of the democratic ideals to the Middle East.  Tunisia and Egypt, in particular, underwent their “first really liberal revolutions,” distinct from “nationalism as an inspiration, or Islam as an inspiration, or indeed socialism.”[1]  In both of these states, rampant government corruption and oppression have roots in a “neoliberal economic agenda” coerced by Western powers and instituted by the heads of state.[2]  The ousted leaders of these two countries, Zine El Abedine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, both subscribed to the structural economic alterations encouraged by the International Monetary Fund based on policies of fiscal austerity.[3]  However, the result of this was a “deeply corrupt endeavor” based on “mafia-style competitive advantage, backed by the state security apparatus.”[4]  Thus, a vicious cycle was perpetuated from the late 20th century until 2011 in which economic inequality became more severe, dissidence began to take a stronger hold, and more antagonistic means of suppression were instituted by the regimes.  Through this lens, it is easy to see the buildup to the Arab Spring in the decades prior to the actual revolutions.  Tunisia and Egypt share a highly similar historical backdrop prior to 2011; however, when the revolutionary spirit swept over the region, the paths of the countries completely diverged.  Tunisian revolutionaries now boast a “new constitution that is one of the most liberal in the Arab world.”, due to the dissolution of the “brutal security police” upon the removal of Zine El Abedine Ben Ali along with the cession of power by Ennahda, the nation’s leading ruling Islamic party.[5]  Egypt, on the opposite end of the spectrum, has passed referendums giving “power and immunity to the military and the police.” [6]. Subsequently, this new military regime has instituted a highly aggressive, bloody crackdown on all dissidents.  This has essentially left the pro-democratic factions in Egypt in a “restrictive police state” that is similar, if not worse, than before. However, Tunisia and Egypt share a similar history of violent government oppression and corruption.[7] Therefore,it is imperative to analyze what fundamental factors resulted in the  divergence in political outcomes from the Arab Spring. Understanding why revolutions succeed or fail in establishing enduring democracies, specifically in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, generates a more inclusive criteria to determine the likelihood of success of uprisings around the world.

The latter half of the 20th century has brought about the rapid expansion of democracy throughout the world.  The momentum of this international movement continues to provide an overarching paradigm for how a government is expected to interact with constituents and how institutions are ought to be structured.  This global trend, according to Andreas Schedler, a professor of political science at the Center for Economic Teaching and Research in Mexico City, has inspired political scientists to place a much greater emphasis on “democratic consolidation.”[8] This phrase refers to the processes by which newly established democracies stabilize their regime, thereby “extending their life expectancy beyond the short term” and, subsequently, thwarting off the “threat of authoritarian regression.”[9] Democratic consolidation involves the institution of “a political system that allows opposition, rivalry, or competition between a government and its opponents” according to Robert Alan Dahl, a former Yale professor and political scientist.[10]  Dahl constructs the argument that democratic consolidation can only be achieved if citizens of the state have the opportunity to “have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government.”[11] This essentially means that fair opposition between coalitions in government, along with the equal participation of citizens, are the most critical factors for democratic consolidation. The difficult task for scholars is identifying the fundamental cause of either success or obstruction to democratic consolidation, which leads to failure of the regime.  Valerie Bunce, a professor of International Studies and Government at Cornell University, poses the argument that a multitude of factors, such as economic development, the role of the elite class, and the structuring of institutions shape the stability and endurance of democracies post-revolution.[12]  Bunce states that “[t]he level of economic development seems to have considerable impact not so much on whether democracy exists as on its sustainability over time” while also asserting that “the founders of democracy” act as “its sustainers or its underminers.”  Essentially, the argument being made is that the fate of a newly established democratic regime rests in the decisions made by the political leaders responsible for the new authority, as well as the economic condition of the state.  “Institutional design,” as Bunce refers to it, then becomes a critical factor due to the fact that it results from each of these variables.  The elite class in a given state “can use [its] power to either protect democracy or destroy it” based on its choice of institutions during periods of economic or political discourse.  While this explanation articulates many imperative factors to democratic consolidation following the installation of democracy in a state, it neglects the period of time immediately after the regime change during which the elite class has not secured power completely and the institutions that provide a basis for democracy are not yet constructed.  It is during this period that the fate of the state is truly determined based upon who is able to seize power.  Therefore, one must narrow the scope of their focus to the period of time after the upheaval of an authoritarian regime and before the new regime begins democratic consolidation.  In recent decades, it has been brought to the attention of political scientists that the role of the military during this transitional period could provide a critical insight into the prospects for either success or failure for achieving democracy.  According to Zoltan Barany, “the military is potentially one of the most consequential institutional actors in postauthoritarian transitions.”[13] Barany develops the notion that it is relatively common in authoritarian regimes to award military officials with high-ranking political offices and “above average living standards” in order to secure “armed forces’ loyalty.”[14]  This escalation of military officials to the elite class sets the groundwork for their continued influence throughout the aforementioned “postauthoritarian transition.”  So, while this argument does not contradict Bunce’s construction of the factors leading to democratization, it helps to supplement the theory and outline a causal chain defining the way in which the elite (one facet of which is the military, according to Barany) seize power in order to subsequently determine the course of a state.  However, the overarching difficulty with this theory is its reliance on what Rollin F. Tusalem calls “anecdotal case studies and macro-historical assessments,” as opposed to “empirical study.”[15] Therefore, it becomes necessary to identify a means of comparing the role of the armed forces in transitional states using practical, concrete data.  This is the exercise that Tusalem subsequently performs, and that which will be used as the scope in order to rationalize the factors for Tunisia’s success in instituting a new democratic regime, Egypt’s blatant failure, and each states’ likelihood of future democratic stability.

Having constructed a fundamental understanding of the preliminary phases of democratic consolidation, Tusalem articulates the “politicisation of the military” as the most essential variable in the “survivability of democracies.”[16]  The democratic success of transitional states is highly dependent on the degree to which the military intervenes in executive affairs.  Therefore, the most effective explanation of the relationship between transitional states and the politicization of armed forces is provided by a reiteration of Tusalem’s hypothesis.  The fundamental thesis asserts that “[t]ransitional states with a politicised military…are less likely to consolidate their democracy.”[17]  Building upon this, the author makes the assertion that those transitional states with a history of coups or other forms of an “interventionist military” have a higher propensity to fail in democratic consolidation.  This leads to the overarching hypothesis that “[t]ransitional states that have a politicised military infrastructure are less likely to have accountable governments.”[18]  Due to the fact that government accountability is a rudimentary factor of successful democracy, this implies that democratic consolidation is nearly impossible when paired with military politicization.  These hypotheses are the most effective in comparing the transitional statehood of Egypt and Tunisia due to a multitude of factors.

In order to quantify the aforementioned hypotheses, it is necessary to analyze empirical data on the extent to which a government facilitates justice and equality, the level of accountability toward its constituency, and the state’s projected propensity toward regressing into an authoritarian regime.  After this is done, it becomes possible to effectively measure the politicization of the military.  The first of these factors is calculated by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Score of Democracy, which “provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories.”[19] This index assigns a score, on a scale of 1-10, to each country based on electoral process and pluralism, functionality of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties in order to generally quantify the level of democracy in a state.  In this listing, Tunisia (which received a net score of 5.67) surpasses Egypt (4.56) in every one of the measured categories.  The most prominent distinction between these two states is their degree of electoral process and pluralism according to the Economist’s Index.  Tunisia received a score of 5.75, while Egypt earned only a 3.42.  This implies that the government’s facilitation of multiple parties and conflicting political views in Egypt is much more despotic than in Tunisia.  Furthermore, it provides empirical data to indicate that the electoral process in Egypt is far less inclusive and democratic than in Tunisia.  This directly correlates with the military’s ability to seize and consolidate power without alarming the general public.  In order to measure the facet of the hypothesis focused on countries with a history of an interventionist military, one must analyze the severity and frequency of coups in both Egyptian and Tunisian history.  In Egypt, the only other military coup in recent history, other than the 2011 military overthrow, occurred in 1952.  Prime Minister Aly Maher was ousted by General Muhammad Neguib who then “formed a new civilian government with himself as prime minister and commander-in-chief.”[20]  Tunisia has a similar history of coups in terms of the degree of an interventionist military.  In 1987, Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali declared President Bourguiba “mentally unfit to rule” and initiated a coup to place himself into power.[21]  Ben Ali would continue to rule until the Arab Spring uprisings removed him from power.

In terms of coup history Egypt and Tunisia are comparable, in that they have each experienced one in the last century.  Therefore, in order to test this hypothesis it becomes necessary to analyze the degree of consistent military intervention, as opposed to the amount of tangible examples in which the military has exerted influence, such as a coup.  The military in Tunisia has consistently been an outlier in that it has never developed an “economically reinforcing relationship with the ruling regime.”[22]  Furthermore, under the rule of Ben Ali, Tunisia has possessed a “small-sized, non-politicized military, whose chief of staff, Rachid Ammar…turned aside any suggestion that he and his fellow officers, and not civilians, assume control of the country.”[23]  These factors laid the framework for a highly democratic revolution, as opposed to one in which the military took control to restore order, as in Egypt.  The Egyptian military enjoyed “lucrative land and business deals” under the rule of Hosni Mubarak.  However, in recent years “generals felt their influence slipping away as Mubarak disregarded their economic interests,” making the Arab Spring protests “an opportunity to restore its central position.”[24]  The Egyptian military was able to use its proximity to the government to channel “public outrage over corruption” toward their political opponents, specifically the elite class with economic ties to Mubarak.  It was because of this politicization in the years leading up to the uprisings that the military was able to utilize the revolution as a means of forcing out opposition in government and consolidating power.  The armed forces were able to redirect accountability towards the regime, which had already lost nearly all public support.  In Tunisia, corruption in the regime was largely limited to Ben Ali’s “immediate family and his small circle of cronies, and not the military hierarchy.”  This lack of politicization and integration into political affairs among the armed forced was imperative in their public image and ability to endure the revolution and emerge “as the only strong political institution left standing.”  So, although the number of coups in both Tunisia and Egypt equates, the degree of military intervention and politicization is vastly different and has a clear impact on the outcome of the uprisings in each state.

Based on the study of the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Tusalem’s hypotheses on military politicization and its effect on democratic consolidation is an accurate paradigm regarding the factors that cause either success or failure in transitional states.  Government accountability directly correlates to the degree of military politicization in each of these transitional states.  In Egypt, the high degree of politicization in the armed forces encouraged less accountability in the Mubarak regime, whereas the Tunisian government’s accountability was augmented by the political disparity between the government and the military.  This accountability shaped the course of democratic consolidation in each of the states and coerced failure in Egypt and success in Tunisia.  Therefore, the overarching conclusion from these cases is that the fundamental factor in a transitional state’s ability to institute a sustainable and effective democracy is the politicization of the military.  The limitations in this analysis are largely rooted in one’s inability to distinguish between the effect of individuals and the effect of institutional structure.  This means that, due to the fact that the success of consolidation is deeply affected by both the structure of the military and the actions of individuals, it is difficult to determine which has a more profound impact on a given transitional state.  In both Egypt and Tunisia, the acquisition or cession of power by individuals deeply affected the course of the state (i.e General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Rachid Ammar, respectively).[25]  However, there is also a clear indication that the institutional structure of the armed forces in each state swayed the outcome of democratic consolidation.  Therefore, there are on what factors have the most salient effect on the politicization of the military.  Another restriction in this study is the lack of a substantial timeframe to study in order to analyze the sustainability of Tunisia’s democracy.  Although it is clear that, since the Arab Spring in 2011, Egypt’s democratic consolidation has failed and Tunisia’s has taken significant steps toward a successful democracy, it is unclear if the new Tunisian government will thrive or falter. The short timeframe researchers have to analyze is certainly a limitation in this study.  However, applying Tusalem’s hypothesis on the politicization of the military to the case of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt has proven to be an effective and comprehensive method for understanding democratic consolidation in these transitional states’.

Daniel Tomanelli

Political Science and International Affairs ’18